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We explore  how  models  of  boundedly  rational  decision-making  in  games  can  explain  the
overdissipation  of  rents in  laboratory  Tullock  contest  games.  Using  a new  series  of  exper-
iments in which  group  size  is  varied  across  sessions,  we  ﬁnd  that  models  based  on  logit
choice  organize  the data well.  In  this  setting,  logit  quantal  response  equilibrium  (QRE)
is  a limit  of  a cognitive  hierarchy  (CH)  model  with  logit  best  responses  for appropriate
parameters.  While  QRE  captures  the  data  well, the  CH  ﬁts  provide  support  for relaxing
the  equilibrium  assumption.  Both  the QRE  and  CH models  have  parameters  which  capture
boundedness  of  rationality.  The maximum  likelihood  ﬁts  of both  models  yield  parameters
indicating  rationality  is  more  restricted  as  group  size  grows.  Period-by-period  adjustments
of expenditures  are  more  likely  to be in  the  earnings-improving  direction  in  smaller  groups.
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V. 
. Introduction
Tullock (1980) introduced a simple model of competition, in which competitors irreversibly expend costly resources in
Open access under CC BY license.he hope of obtaining a prize of ﬁxed value. The winner of the prize is determined stochastically, with a competitor’s chances
f victory increasing as he expends more resources. Variations of the basic model can be applied to settings ranging from
obbying for political inﬂuence, to research and development races, to fund-raising lotteries. This broad applicability has
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supported a vibrant literature on studying these games in the laboratory. A majority of laboratory studies ﬁnd that subjects
on average exceed the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium predictions for resource expenditure. Morgan et al. (2012), in their
Table 1, provide an excellent summary of the literature which illustrates the robustness of this result. Millner and Pratt
(1989), Davis and Reilly et al. (1998), Fonseca (2009), Morgan et al. (2012), and Fallucchi et al. (2012), among others, observe
higher-than-Nash average expenditure using a variety of designs.
A number of explanations have been advanced to attempt to account for the overdissipation of rents in these contests.
Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009) and Sheremeta (2011) propose biases in judgment lead to aggressive play. Parco et al. (2005),
Sheremeta (2010) and Sheremeta (2011) investigate the extent to which a non-monetary preference for winning can account
for high expenditure levels. Mago et al. (2012) and Wärneryd (2012) develop the idea that higher expenditures form an
evolutionarily stable behavior.
In the analysis in this paper, our focus will be on statistical models of boundedly rational behavior, supposing that play is
noisy and that participants do not calculate or play best responses precisely. This approach has been considered in the past
in Tullock contests by Sheremeta (2011) and Schmidt et al. (2013), as well as by Bullock and Rutstrom (2007) in a transfer-
seeking game presented using a matrix frame.1 Our model is founded on a logit-response assumption, which underlies
a noisy cognitive hierarchy model in the spirit of Camerer et al. (2004), and a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model
(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). The model relaxes Nash equilibrium in two ways: (1) by permitting players to hold incorrect
beliefs about the play of others, and (2) by assuming players may  not choose best replies with probability one. Logit quantal
response equilibrium, cognitive hierarchy with exact best responses for higher-order thinkers, and Nash equilibrium are all
special cases of our model. In particular, in our estimation we  do not need to impose the mutual-consistency assumption
inherent in Nash equilibrium or logit QRE.
A criticism of statistical models of the sort we consider is that they are often employed in a post-hoc fashion, with less
attention given to the ability of models to organize data across treatments. Haile et al. (2008) point out that quantal response-
type models can capture essentially arbitrary distributions of play, unless further restrictions are imposed. In our model,
there are two parameters, capturing the mean number of degrees of iterative reasoning, and the precision of best responses.
Results in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and Rogers et al. (2009) show that when ﬁtting parameters in models similar to ours
across games, the resulting estimates can vary substantially.
In our experiment, the treatment variable is the number of players participating in the contest. We  consider contests
with two, four, and nine players, in an across-subjects design. The Nash equilibrium prediction is that the expenditure per
player decreases as the number of players increases, while the total expenditure of all players increases, converging to full
dissipation of the rent from below. In our model, individual expenditure is less sensitive to group size than Nash equilibrium
predicts. For model parameterizations far from Nash equilibrium, total group expenditure rises more rapidly as the number
of players increases, to levels well in excess of full dissipation of the value of the prize.
There are three previous studies which directly or indirectly consider the effect of group size on behavior in Tullock
contests. Anderson and Stafford (2003) provide the most direct manipulation. In a one-shot contingent-choice design, par-
ticipants are asked to formulate contest expenditures in each of six possible settings, which vary both in the number of
players as well as heterogeneity of costs. They ﬁnd that in general a larger number of opponents results in lower expendi-
tures, although in their data average expenditure in ﬁve-player contests actually exceeds that in two-player and four-player
games. Sheremeta (2011) investigates, among other treatments, whether total expenditure is larger in a grand contest involv-
ing four players, versus two sub-contests, involving two players each, each for a prize worth one-half as much. He ﬁnds that
individual expenditure relative to the prize is lower for the four-player contests. Morgan et al. (2012) study contests where
potential participants may  choose to enter, or to sit out the contest and accept an outside option payoff. This generates
contests with different numbers of players, depending on the entry decisions of the subjects. They also generally ﬁnd that
when the number of players is larger, individual expenditure falls.2
Our experiment is the ﬁrst to consider the effect of group size in an across-subjects design with repeated trials and holding
constant the size of the prize and endowment. Qualitatively consistent with our model, and generally in contrast to previous
results, we ﬁnd that the group size has little effect on average expenditure levels. However, we do ﬁnd treatment effects
in terms of the distribution of expenditures, with expenditures being more dispersed in larger groups. Because average
individual expenditures do not respond to the group size, the result is that aggregate expenditures are signiﬁcantly larger
in larger groups, with nine-player groups spending on average almost three times the value of the prize.
Because in our experiment the earnings-maximizing best response depends only on the total expenditure of other players,
and not on the number of players per se, our experiment allows us to ask whether the bounded rationality parameters of
our model are stable within a class of games, and an experimental environment, where as much as possible is held constant.
Previous results in such domains are mixed; Gronberg et al. (2012) report stable estimates of the logit QRE parameter across
two treatments in a public goods game, whereas Sheremeta (2011) reports QRE parameter estimates which vary across
1 In addition, Morgan et al. (2012) and Potters et al. (1998) display distributions of expenditures in Tullock contests which are qualitatively consistent
with  the predictions of our model. Those authors do not pursue modeling the heterogeneity in their data. Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) study the related
all-pay auction and ﬁnd some support for the predictions of QRE from Anderson et al. (1998a).
2 In addition, there are several studies which consider the effects of the number of players in all-pay auctions and in tournaments, which share some
characteristics of the Tullock contest game. See Dechenaux et al. (2012) for a survey of these results.
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ifferent implementations of contests. Our parameter estimates indicate that decisions are noisier, relative to the ﬁnancial
takes in the experiment, in larger groups. Therefore, the overdissipation observed in large groups has two components;
t arises partly because decisions are heterogeneous in the ﬁrst place, and partly because the precision of best responses
egrades in larger groups.
To investigate this last result more fully, we examine period-by-period changes in expenditures in relation to the pre-
ictions of learning direction theory (Selten and Buchta, 1994; Selten and Chmura, 2008). We  ﬁnd that, when the number of
ontestants is small, subjects do tend to adjust their expenditure in the direction of better responses, as learning direction
heory would predict. With larger numbers of contestants, adjustment, when it occurs, is equally likely to be away from
he earnings-maximizing choice as it is toward it. This observation is consistent with the interpretation of lower values for
est-response precision in larger groups, in that both indicate that the expected payoffs of decisions have less explanatory
ower in organizing subject expenditure when more contestants are present.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we ﬁrst describe the Tullock contest game, and provide an exposition
f the logit cognitive hierarchy framework in this setting. In Section 3, we lay out the design of our experiment. Section 4
resents our data and analysis of the results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion.
. Theory
.1. The game
We  study a single-prize contest following Tullock (1980). There is a commonly known number of players N, each of whom
as an endowment ω. The value of the prize to be awarded is V, and is the same for all contestants. Each contestant i = 1,
 . .,  N simultaneously chooses an amount xi ∈ [0, ω] to spend. The chance of contestant i winning the prize given a proﬁle of
xpenditures
{
xj
}N
j=1 is xi/(
∑N
j=1xj). The prize is not awarded if x1 = . . . = xN = 0.
For a given contestant i, write the sum of other contestants’ choices as X−i =
∑
j /= ixj. The expected monetary payoff to
ontestant i is
ui(x1, . . .,  xN) = ω − xi +
xi
xi + X−i
· V. (1)
f players are risk-neutral, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium, assuming ω is large enough, in which
x1 = . . . = xN = x(N) =
N − 1
N2
· V. (2)
he total expenditure in Nash equilibrium is (N − 1)/N · V, which is less than the amount of the prize.
.2. Statistical models of noisy play
.2.1. Logit best responses
In laboratory experiments studying Tullock contests, expenditure levels are observed across the entire strategy space, a
henomenon Chowdhury et al. (2013) refer to as “overspreading.” In addition, Sheremeta (2010), Morgan et al. (2012), and
chmidt et al. (2013) all demonstrate that the size of the strategy space shapes behavior, in that restricting the endowment
o be less than the value of the prize lowers expenditures, even when the endowment remains large relative to the value of
he prize. To capture these regularities, the building block of our theoretical analysis is a random-utility model using the logit
peciﬁcation. Let  denote a mixed strategy over the feasible expenditures. Denote by u(x ; ) the expected payoff to a player
f he chooses expenditure level x, assuming all other players play according to the mixed strategy .3 The player observes
ot the expected payoff itself, but rather the expected payoff plus some additive noise term, i.e., u˜(x; ) = u(x; ) + εx, where
he noise term is independently drawn for each expenditure from the extreme value distribution with precision parameter
 ≥ 0. Then, the player’s choice probability for each expenditure x is given by4
ˆ(x) = exp(u(x; ))∫
y
exp(u(y; ))
. (3)
For  = 0, this reduces to uniform randomization; in the limit as → ∞,  best responses are chosen with probability one.
Applying this to the Tullock contest game, let P(X) be the probability that the sum of the other N − 1 players’ expenditures
s equal to X, assuming that mixed strategy  is played. Then, the expected payoff to spending x isu(x; ) = ω − x + V
∫
x
x + X dP(X), (4)
3 Here and subsequently we  consider the case of symmetric play, and therefore omit player-speciﬁc subscripts.
4 The standard derivation of the logit choice rule requires the set of choices be discrete. For convenience, we follow Anderson et al. (1998b,a) and others in
orking with a continuous strategy space in parts of the exposition. The application of the model is done in a discrete space, with sums replacing integrals
s  appropriate.
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for x > 0, and u(0 ; ) = ω. Differentiating with respect to x gives
∂u(x; )
∂x
= −1 + V
∫
X
(x + X)2
dP(X) (5)
The logit decision distribution implies
ˆ(x) = K exp(u(x; )) (6)
with K being the normalization constant to ensure integration to unity. Differentiating with respect to x,
dˆ(x)
dx
= K∂u(x; )
∂x
exp(u(x; )) (7)
= (x)∂u(x; )
∂x
(8)
= (x)
[
−1 + V
∫
X
(x + X)2
dP(X)
]
. (9)
Proposition 1. For any conjectured distribution of expenditures by other players, for any  > 0, the logit distribution of expend-
itures is single-peaked with a unique modal choice.
Proof. The integral in (9) is strictly decreasing in x. Therefore, the term in square brackets is strictly decreasing in x, and
therefore can equal zero for at most one value of x. Because  > 0 and (x) > 0, (9) can equal zero for at most one value of x.
If there exists x > 0 which makes (9) zero, that is the modal choice which maximizes the density . When (9) is negative for
x = 0, then x = 0 is the modal choice. 
The introduction of a noisy best response relaxes one feature of Nash equilibrium. To proceed further, we  must formulate
the beliefs to which a player is (noisily) responding.
2.2.2. Cognitive hierarchy
In a Nash equilibrium, players’ beliefs correctly anticipate the play of others. This assumption of correct beliefs is carried
through to its statistical extension, quantal response equilibrium. Such ﬁxed-point assumptions are analytically convenient,
but implausible as a procedural model of how players think strategically in games. This has led to interest in models which
dispense with such mutual consistency assumptions.
One active family of such models are “level-k” models (Stahl and Wilson, 1995). In standard level-k models, some fraction
of players (at level 0) are assumed to play the game naïvely, usually modeled as choosing a strategy at random. A player at
level 1 chooses a best response to the level 0 strategy; a player at level 2 chooses a best response to the level 1 strategy, and
so on. In this most commonly used version, the notion of precise best response is retained, while removing the assumption
of ﬁxed-point reasoning. We  generalize this by permitting noisy (logit) responses at each level, in a version of the cognitive
hierarchy of Camerer et al. (2004).
Suppose there is a population of players. Each player is of one type k ∈ Z+, where k is the number of steps of reasoning
the player undertakes. The proportion of players of type k in the population is f(k). The behavior rules for each type are built
up iteratively. Type k = 0 randomizes uniformly over all actions. For types k > 0, players are assumed to be overconﬁdent,
believing that all other players are using strictly fewer steps of reasoning. Therefore, their beliefs about the types of other
players are truncated; player k’s belief about the proportion of type h < k in the population is gk(h) = f (h)/(
∑k−1
t=0 f (t)) for
h < k, and gk(h) = 0 for h ≥ k. Players have correct beliefs about the play of lower types.
In addition to different steps of strategic sophistication, we  also permit players to make noisy responses. Speciﬁcally, for
all types k > 0, we assume that players of that type play the logit best response to the distribution of play of lower types, with
precision parameter . Finally, we follow Camerer et al. (2004) by assuming that the distribution f of types follows a Poisson
distribution with mean . With this assumption, we  can then compute the prediction of the model by taking a mixture of
the individual expenditure distributions, weighted by the Poisson distribution probabilities.
Let CH(, ) denote the logit-Poisson cognitive hierarchy prediction with  expected levels of reasoning, and logit precision
parameter .2.2.3. Quantal response equilibrium
Another way to close the model is to assume a ﬁxed point, i.e., that (3) is satisﬁed with ˆ = . This leads to the logit quantal
response equilibrium (QRE) concept of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). For  = 0, logit QRE generates uniform randomization
across all expenditures; as → ∞,  the set of logit QRE converges to a subset of the Nash equilibria of the game. We  will write
QRE() to denote the logit QRE prediction with parameter .
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The use of the logit rule for specifying choice probabilities means that in a majority of applications, closed-form expres-
ions for logit QRE are not known.5 Applications of QRE therefore rely on numerical computation to establish predictions.
urocy (2005) demonstrates an efﬁcient, practical algorithm for computing a branch of the set of logit QRE; a reference
mplementation of this algorithm is available in Gambit (McKelvey et al., 2013).
.2.4. Quantitative predictions
We now give an overview of the quantitative predictions of the QRE and CH models in the setting of our experiment, in
hich ω = 1200 and V = 1000. Fig. 1 plots the distribution of individual expenditures for the group sizes N = 2, N = 4, and N = 9
sed in our experiment, with  = {0.5, 1.0}, and  = {1.0, 2.0, 5.0, ∞ }. For each group size, the Nash equilibrium prediction is
lotted as a vertical line for reference. The similarity of the  = 5.0 and  =∞ plots illustrates that CH and QRE make essentially
ndistinguishable predictions, for these values of , already when there are on average ﬁve levels of reasoning being used.
Rogers et al. (2009) have shown that QRE and cognitive hierarchy models with deterministic best responses can each be
hought of as special cases of a more general concept they call truncated heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium. Fig. 1
elates the predictions of logit QRE and logit CH directly. The logit CH model limits to logit QRE in any game if  is sufﬁciently
mall.6 The payoff structure of the game determines how large  can be without destroying this convergence. Below we use
he Tullock contest game with a discretized strategy space for our model ﬁts. When N = 2, convergence holds for all , even
or ﬁnely discretized strategy spaces. For N = 4 and N = 9, convergence holds for all  when the discretization of the strategy
pace is not too ﬁne. Direct calculation veriﬁes that the discretization we use in our estimations is sufﬁciently coarse such
hat CH limits to QRE for all .7
Relative to the QRE baseline, the CH model accommodates distributions of expenditures with thicker right tails and with
odes at lower levels of expenditure. Intuitively, the best response to uniform randomization, the step-0 behavior, is to
xpend very small (possibly zero) amounts.8 Therefore, the step-1 logit response will have its mode at or near zero. When
 is small, a large proportion of the population is assumed to be step-0 or step-1, so these characteristics of those types’
ecision distributions are therefore reﬂected in the aggregate prediction.
Fig. 2 plots how average individual and group expenditure changes in QRE as a function of  and the group size.9 Average
ndividual expenditures start at one-half the endowment and converge to the Nash equilibrium prediction from above in
his setting, as observed previously by Sheremeta (2010). With larger groups, this convergence in individual expenditure is
ufﬁciently slow that at the group level, total expenditure can exceed the value of the prize, often by substantial amounts.
The calculations illustrate that if  is independent of the number of players, then the presence of heterogeneity alone
ould account for a signiﬁcant increase in overdissipation when the number of players increases. However, there is no reason
o assume  is independent of the number of players, and indeed we estimate it separately for each group size. The models
herefore allow us to distinguish how much the change in overdissipation can be attributed to the fact that best responses
re imprecise in the ﬁrst place, as opposed to changes in the precision of best responses as the number of other players is
aried.
. Experimental design
We  report on a total of 9 experimental sessions, conducted at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL)
sing subjects recruited from the participant pool maintained by the laboratory. The group size was varied across sessions,
ith three sessions conducted with each group size N = 2, N = 4, and N = 9. Cohort sizes ranged from 12 to 22 subjects.
At the beginning of each session, the instructions (see Appendix A) were read aloud. For comparability with the literature,
he instructions followed the standard convention of using lottery terminology in presenting the game to the subjects. After
he instructions were read and clarifying questions answered, subjects completed a questionnaire to check their under-
tanding. In particular, the comprehension questionnaire veriﬁed each subject’s ability to compute the expected earnings
rising from given combinations of the subject’s own expenditure and expenditures by other subjects in the same group.In each session there were 10 iterations of the game. In each period, subjects were randomly rematched into groups of
ize N. Each subject was given an endowment ω = 1200 tokens in each period. Subjects simultaneously selected a number of
okens between 0 and 1200 to spend in competition for a prize worth V = 1000 tokens. Feedback on each round was  given
n two stages. After the token expenditures were selected, but before realizing the random outcome, each subject viewed a
5 Two exceptions are Anderson et al. (1998a), who obtain closed-form expressions for the QRE of the related all-pay auction, and Anderson et al. (1998b),
ho  provide closed-form QRE for some classes of public goods games with linear or quadratic payoffs. The technology used in those papers to establish the
losed-form solutions is defeated by the dependence of the integral in (9) on the full distribution of the sum of other players’ expenditures, which appears
n  the denominator of the winning probability.
6 This is implied by the result in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) which shows that the logit mapping deﬁned by (3) is a contraction when  is small.
herefore, iterative application of the mapping from any initial distribution of play converges to the unique QRE for that .
7 When the strategy space is a sufﬁciently ﬁne grid, and  and N are large enough, CH(, ) instead exhibits cyclical behavior as  is increased. Intuitively,
his  occurs because the Nash equilibrium is unstable under perturbed best reply dynamics when N is larger.
8 This is because our endowment is at least as big as the value of the prize. If the endowment were sufﬁciently small this would no longer necessarily be
rue.  This is why, as Sheremeta (2010) notes, QRE can capture the effect of the size of the strategy space on the aggressiveness of expenditures.
9 The predictions of the CH model are similar and are therefore omitted.
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(a) CH(τ = 1.0, λ = 0.5) (b) CH(τ = 1.0, λ = 1.0)
(c) CH(τ = 2.0, λ = 0.5) (d) CH(τ = 2.0, λ = 1.0)
(e) CH(τ = 5.0, λ = 0.5) (f) CH(τ = 5.0, λ = 1.0)
(g) limτ →∞ CH(τ, λ = 0.5) = QRE(λ = 0.5) (h) limτ →∞ CH(τ, λ = 1.0) = QRE(λ = 1.0)
Fig. 1. Comparison of CH and QRE model predictions. The vertical lines indicate the Nash equilibrium expenditure for each group size N.
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(a) Individual expenditures (b) Group expenditures
Fig. 2. Individual and group expenditures predicted by QRE, as a function of  and the group size. The horizontal dashed line in total expenditures indicates
full  dissipation of the surplus.
Table 1
Mean expenditures per session, by treatment.
Treatment Mean expenditure by session Mean Nash
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TN = 2 351 339 287 331 250
N  = 4 277 377 254 300 188
N  = 9 380 251 348 326 99
creen reporting his/her own chosen expenditure, the sum of the expenditures of all other subjects in the same group, and
he probability with which (s)he would win the contest. Then, a subsequent screen displayed the realization of the (random)
ottery outcome for that subject, and the total income in the round, computed as the endowment, minus the expenditure,
lus any income from winning the contest. No subject IDs were reported in the computer interface, nor did subjects have
ccess to any history of play besides their own experience.
At the end of the 10 periods, one of the 10 periods was selected at random, and subjects’ earnings for this portion of the
xperimental session were determined by the selected period with the exchange rate 100 tokens = $1.
After the 10 periods of Tullock contest games, the experimental session continued with 40 rounds of unrelated games.
he overall length of each session was about two hours, with the contest portion comprising under an hour on average. In
ddition to their decision-contingent earnings, subjects received a $5 show-up fee.
. Results
esult 1. Average expenditure exceeds the Nash equilibrium prediction for all group sizes. The average expenditure does
ot differ signiﬁcantly across group sizes. There is weak evidence for learning over time only when N = 9.
upport. Table 1 provides mean expenditures by session for each treatment. In each session, mean expenditures exceed
he Nash prediction, replicating the standard result in the case where the endowment is at least as large as the value of the
rize. Notably, the expenditures do not appear to be sensitive to the group size.
Fig. 3 plots the mean expenditure by period, aggregated across sessions for each group size. Even though expenditures
xceed Nash predictions by large margins, there is little visual evidence of a signiﬁcant convergence toward Nash equilibrium.
here is no clear ordering of group sizes at any stage of the experiment.
Fig. 3. Mean expenditure by period, aggregated across sessions, for each group size.
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Table 2
Panel estimation of group-size effects on the amount of expenditure and overdissipation. Treatment N = 4 is taken as a baseline. Model includes a random
effects error structure, with the individual subject as the random effect; standard errors are clustered at the session level. Robust standard errors are
reported. Key hypothesis tests regarding the coefﬁcients are reported, with their p-values for the two-sided alternative.
Dependent variable: xit Coefﬁcient Std err Test p-Value
ˇ0 Baseline N = 4 293.14 31.98 ˇ0 = 188 0.001
ˇN=2 Dummy  for N = 2 21.68 37.21 ˇ0 + ˇN=2 = 250 0.0007
ˇN=2 = 0 0.560
ˇN=9 Dummy  for N = 9 56.21 38.55 ˇ0 + ˇN=9 = 99 <0.0001
ˇN=9 = 0 0.145
ˇt Period number baseline 1.33 8.56 ˇt = 0 0.876
ˇt×N=2 Period interaction N = 2 1.54 9.15 ˇt + ˇt×N=2 = 0 0.375
ˇt×N=9 Period interaction N = 9 -5.54 8.83 ˇt + ˇt×N=9 = 0 0.053
To formalize these observations, we conduct a regression, with individual expenditure as the dependent variable. We
use the N = 4 treatment as the baseline, as this is the most common group size to date in the literature on Tullock contest
experiments, and deﬁne dummy  variables for the N = 2 and N = 9 treatments. We  also include the period number as a time
trend, and interact this with the treatment dummies. Following e.g. Sheremeta (2010), we use a per-subject random effect,
and cluster standard errors at the level of the session. Results of this estimation are reported in Table 2.
The table includes the key hypothesis tests and corresponding p-values. We  test whether average expenditures are equal
to Nash for that treatment; these hypotheses are rejected with p-values of 0.001 or less. We also test formally whether the
treatment dummy  variables are signiﬁcantly different from zero; we  cannot reject these hypotheses at the 10% level, and
therefore cannot conclude that mean individual expenditure is sensitive to the number of players.
Turning to adjustment over time, we test for a non-zero time trend in each treatment. We  cannot reject the null hypothesis
of no trend in the N = 2 or N = 4 treatments at the 10% signiﬁcance level, but there is weak support for a decreasing trend in the
N = 9 treatment (p-value 0.053). Nevertheless, average play remains far from Nash even after 10 iterations. The regression
predicts an average expenditure of 345 in the ﬁrst period versus 307 in the tenth period, still far from the Nash prediction
of 99. The absence of a statistically identiﬁable time trend may  be a function of our 10-period design; time trends reported
in other studies (e.g. Sheremeta, 2010) are small enough to require many periods to have a statistically and economically
signiﬁcant effect. 
Because the average individual expenditure does not depend in a signiﬁcant way  on the group size, it follows that total
expenditure increases rapidly as the group size increases. For group sizes N = 4 and N = 9, we  ﬁnd that total expenditure
exceeds the value of the prize. For example, the average expenditure for a randomly constituted nine-person group in the
N = 9 treatment is $29.35, for a prize worth only $10.
Although there is little evidence that the number of players affects average individual expenditures systematically, there
are differences in the distribution of expenditures as a function of group size.
Result 2. Average expenditures do not change signiﬁcantly across treatments, but distributions of expenditures do. In
larger groups, the distribution is more dispersed. The logit cognitive hierarchy model captures the qualitative features of
the distribution of expenditures.
Support. Fig. 4 plots the kernel-smoothed distribution of individual expenditures for each group size. These distributions
are qualitatively consistent with the predictions of the CH and QRE models in Fig. 1, in that the peak of each distribution
falls below the Nash prediction. In addition, the frequency with which players effectively choose not to enter the contest,
by selecting a zero or very small expenditure, is increasing in the group size, consistent with CH and QRE. In larger groups,
the modal expenditure is lower and the distribution is ﬂatter, with a more substantial right tail. These two effects roughly
balance each other, leaving average expenditure approximately unchanged.
Fig. 4. Kernel density comparison of distribution of expenditures by group size, all 10 periods. Kernel density estimates computed by STATA kdens package,
accounting for boundary corrections, using Silverman bandwidth selection.
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Table  3
Summary of ﬁtted values of CH and QRE models, using all data from all periods. Q measures quality of ﬁt, with Q = 0 corresponding to the uniform density
being the best ﬁt, and Q = 1 the case where the model predicts the observed frequencies perfectly.
N Uniform Maximum Cognitive hierarchy QRE
log L log L (CH , CH) (log L)CH QCH QRE (log L)QRE QQRE
2 −1282.47 −1047.15 (0.779, 2.52) −1063.19 0.932 0.642 −1067.40 0.914
4  −1333.77 −1119.63 (0.772, 2.18) −1132.79 0.938 0.568 −1139.55 0.907
9  −1385.07 −1204.70 (0.430, 1.52) −1223.28 0.897 0.318 −1227.28 0.875
Sum  −4001.31 −3371.48 – −3419.26 – – −3434.23 –
Pooled  — — (0.618, 2.01) −3450.50 0.875 0.471 −3462.96 0.855
(a) N = 2 (b) N = 4
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ig. 5. QRE and CH model best ﬁts compared to distribution of subject expenditures. In each ﬁgure the vertical line indicates the Nash equilibrium prediction.
We  follow the standard set by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and Rogers et al. (2009) in estimating the values of the
arameters  and  from the experimental data.10 We  discretize the game with 13 expenditure levels k = 0, 100, . . .,  1100,
200.11 For each k, individual expenditures in [k − 50, k + 50) are binned and treated as the choice in the discretized game. In
he absence of any evidence of a signiﬁcant time trend, we pool all 10 periods.12 Table 3 summarizes the estimated parameter
alues and log-likelihoods. Fig. 5 compares the distribution functions of the empirical data, and the distribution arising from
he best-ﬁt parameters for each model.
Our estimates for the mean numbers of levels of reasoning  lie between approximately 1.5 and 2.5, which is broadly
onsistent with the stylized fact in the level-k  literature that most players employ between one and three levels of reasoning,
epending on the game. We estimate higher values of  for the cognitive hierarchy models than with the QRE restriction.
his is qualitatively consistent with the results of Golman (2011a,b), who shows that imposing a common value of  in a
RE when agents in fact have heterogeneous precision parameters leads to a downward bias; that is, QRE estimates make
layers out to be less precise in their responses than they actually are. Rogers et al. (2009) show that a (noiseless) cognitive
ierarchy model is observationally equivalent to a QRE model where players differ in their response precisions.
We construct a measure to capture the quality of the obtained ﬁts. Both QRE and CH generate uniform randomization
hen  = 0; therefore, any ﬁt necessarily results in a log-likelihood at least as good as that of the uniform distribution. In the
10 Our approach to ﬁtting the model parameters is the same as that in Rogers et al. (2009). Our “CH” model differs from theirs in that ours has a stochastic
est  response at east step, whereas their step-1 and higher players best response precisely.
11 A substantial majority of our observations occur exactly on multiples of 100, so this discretization of the game parallels what many participants did
mplicitly.
12 The main results are not sensitive to using all 10 periods; similar conclusions are obtained looking only at the ﬁrst 5 or last 5 periods.
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Table 4
Evaluation of quality of ﬁt of models from a strategic perspective.
N Mean expenditure Best response BR payoff
Data CH QRE Data CH QRE Data CH QRE2 331 336 345 211 213 212 1457 1445 1436
4  300 284 307 121 129 108 1234 1233 1227
9  326 325 321 0 0 0 1200 1200 1200
other extreme, the best possible log-likelihood would result if a model predicted the empirical distribution exactly. Let ln Lu
be the log-likelihood associated with the uniform distribution, and ln Lm the log-likelihood associated with a perfect ﬁt. We
deﬁne a pseudo-R2 measure Q as
Q = ln L − ln Lu
ln Lm − ln Lu . (10)
We  report values for this measure for all ﬁts in Table 3. Fit quality is high by this measure for all treatments, formalizing
the quality of the ﬁt observable from inspection of Fig. 5. 
Result 3. The null hypothesis that parameters are constant across group sizes can be rejected for both the CH and QRE
models. QRE can be rejected statistically in favor of CH, but the practical beneﬁt of the improved ﬁt is small.
Support. First we consider whether the parameter estimates for each model are independent of the group size. We  ﬁt
each model with the restriction that the parameter(s) remain the same for all group sizes. The results are reported in the
row labeled “Pooled” in Table 3. For CH, we reject the null hypothesis of equality of parameters using a likelihood ratio test
(log-likelihood −3450.50 for the pooled model versus −3419.26 for the non-pooled, with 4 degrees of freedom; p-value
≈10−13). For QRE, we also reject the null of equality of parameters (log-likelihood −3462.96 for the pooled versus −3434.23
for the non-pooled, with 2 degrees of freedom; p-value ≈10−13).13
Because QRE is a special case of CH for the discretization we have chosen, we  test the null hypothesis of QRE against the
alternative of CH, for each group size. We  can statistically reject QRE in favor of CH using a likelihood ratio test, with p-values
0.004 for N = 2, 0.0002 for N = 4, and 0.005 for N = 9.
Does the improved ﬁt from using the CH model have a practical beneﬁt? Table 4 compares the empirical data, the best-ﬁt
CH model, and the best-ﬁt QRE model, in three quantities relevant to a potential player in the game. Both the CH and QRE
predict the mean individual expenditure closely. The best responses against the best-ﬁt CH and QRE distributions are also
very close to the best response against the empirical data. That is to say, if a player conjectured play to be according to the
best-ﬁt CH or QRE distribution and best responded to that distribution, their play would be very close to the best response
if they knew the empirical distribution exactly.
The ﬁnancial consequences of this optimization error are captured in the last group of columns. This group presents the
expected earnings of a player playing the best response derived from the CH or QRE distribution, respectively, against the
empirical distribution. For N = 2 and N = 4, playing the best response to CH gives only slightly higher earnings than the best
response to QRE; for N = 9, the play is sufﬁciently aggressive that the best response is zero expenditure. The practical beneﬁt
of the CH model, measured in payoff terms, is negligible relative to QRE. 
Mathematically,  expresses the relative inﬂuence that expected monetary payoffs have on choices, as opposed to the
effects of other, unobserved random inﬂuences. Lower values of  correspond to logit choice distributions where the unob-
served payoff shocks have greater variance, and therefore greater inﬂuence on observed choices. Because  is denominated
in payoff terms, the estimates are already capturing any differences in the expected payoff consequences of “errors” as N
is varied. Therefore, the fact that  estimates decrease in N for both models cannot be attributed to changes in the opti-
mization premium due to group size. In addition, the feedback structure across treatments was the same, providing total
expenditure by others in the group; in the Tullock contest, what matters for determining best responses is the anticipated
total expenditures and not per se the number of other participants.
The logit choice component of the model is statistical rather than behavioral in nature. There is no underlying theory or
procedural description as to how  arises in practice. We  therefore look at behavior at a more micro level to examine the
underpinnings of our estimates of  more closely. One interpretation of smaller values of  is that either subjects are less able
to identify how to adjust behavior to improve expected earnings, or are less interested in doing so. We can ask whether there
is any evidence showing that subjects tend to adapt in directions which improve expected earnings. The learning direction
theory of Selten and Buchta (1994) is a simple heuristic model in which agents adjust their choices in response to recent
experience. Learning direction theory asserts that, given an action proﬁle {at} played in period t, subject i will choose an
action at+1
i
in the subsequent period which is in the direction toward the best response against the previous-period choices
of others, {at−i}.
13 Here we  are comparing the respective best-ﬁt models.
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Table  5
Summary statistics on directions of period-by-period adjustment relative to best response.
N = 2 N = 4 N = 9
Total observations 450 468 486
No  change 176 177 179
%  with no change 39.1 37.8 36.8
Toward best response 178 169 151
Away  from best response 96 122 156
%  changes toward best response 64.9 58.1 49.2
Table 6
Logistic panel regressions capturing determinants of decisions whether to adjust and the direction of adjustment. A per-subject random effect is included.
Dependent variable: I(xi,t /= xi,t−1) ˇ SE Odds
(a) Determinants of whether expenditure is changed from previous period
IN=4 −0.329 0.421 0.720
IN=9 −0.732* 0.421 0.481
Period  number −0.167*** 0.029 0.846
Ex-post optimization error 0.0024*** 0.0004 1.002
Won  in previous period −1.601*** 0.368 0.201
Observations 1404
	2 108.76***
Dependent variable: adjustment toward BR  ˇ SE odds
(b) Determinants of whether expenditure is adjusted towards best response, conditional on an adjustment being made
IN=4 −0.491** 0.213 0.612
IN=9 −1.075*** 0.231 0.341
Period  number 0.028 0.029 1.028
Ex-post  optimization error 0.0021*** 0.0004 1.002
Won  in previous period −0.027 0.198 0.973
Observations 872
	2 38.24***
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t* 10% signiﬁcance level.
** 5% signiﬁcance level.
*** 1% signiﬁcance level.
esult 4. Participants adjust decisions in the direction of the best response less consistently as the group size N increases.
upport. Table 5 summarizes, for each group size, how often subjects adjust expenditures in the direction of the myopic
est reply to the expenditures by the other players in the previous period. For all group sizes, in approximately 40% of
nstances the subject chose the same expenditure as the previous period. Among instances in which the subject elected to
djust their expenditures, there is an effect of group size. When facing only one other player, subjects making an adjustment
o their expenditures did so in the direction of the best response 64.9% of the time. This proportion decreases as the group
ize increases, with only 49.2% of the adjustments with N = 9 going in the direction of the best response.
We formalize these observations by performing two logistic panel regressions, with a random effect by participant. The
rst regression examines determinants of whether a participant changes their expenditure level from period t − 1 to period
. Let xit be the expenditure of participant i in period t. The dependent variable is 1 if and only if xit /= xi,t−1. We  include as
ndependent variables dummy  variables for the group size (with N = 2 taken as the baseline and omitted), the period number,
hether the participant won in period t − 1, and a measure of the ex-post optimization error from period t − 1. This latter
easure is computed as follows. Let oi,t−1 be the sum of other participants’ expenditures in participant i’s group in period
 − 1. Given this, we compute x(oi,t−1), the (myopic) best response to the behavior of the other participants in the previous
eriod. The ex-post optimization error is then |xi,t−1 − x(oi,t−1)|.
Table 6a reports the results of this regression. We  can conclude that there is a treatment effect when comparing N = 2 and
 = 9; a participant is signiﬁcantly less likely to change his expenditure in groups with N = 9 versus N = 2. This contrasts with
he aggregate frequencies reported in Table 5, which shows adjustment frequencies to be roughly constant by treatment. The
ntuition for this is that in the N = 9 treatment, the average ex-post optimization error is much larger. In the regression we ﬁnd
he size of the ex-post optimization error is strongly signiﬁcant in determining whether the participant makes an adjustment
n the subsequent period. The two effects therefore operate in opposite directions: adjustment is less likely conditional on
he optimization error in larger groups, but the optimization error is on average much larger. In this regression, we  also ﬁnd
vidence that there is more adjustment in early periods than later ones, and that participants are signiﬁcantly more likely
o adjust after losing in the previous period.
In the second regression, we focus on the instances in which the participant did change their behavior from the previous
eriod. We  conduct a logistic panel regression with the dependent variable being 1 if and only if the participant changes
heir expenditure in the direction (in the strategy space) of the best response. We  use the same set of regressors as in the
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ﬁrst model. Table 6b presents the parameter estimates. We  ﬁnd that the group size has a signiﬁcant effect; adjustment is
signiﬁcantly less likely to be in the direction of the best response when the groups are larger. The size of the optimization
error is again signiﬁcant; the larger the error, the more likely the direction of change is toward the best response. The period
number and whether the participant won in the previous period are not signiﬁcant. 
5. Conclusion
In our experiment, we replicate the result that average individual expenditure is signiﬁcantly above the Nash equilibrium
prediction in Tullock contests, where the endowment is set at least as large as the value of the prize. Our series of experiments
isolates the effect of group size, holding ﬁxed the value of the prize and endowment, with an across-subjects design. Our
10-period sessions allow for some opportunity for subjects to learn and adjust from previous experience. We  ﬁnd that
individual expenditures are not very responsive on average to group size, but that distributions of individual expenditures
do depend on group size. Because individual expenditures do not decline in larger groups, total expenditure exceeds the
value of the prize for four-player and nine-player groups.
Our logit cognitive hierarchy model allows us to relax independently the ﬁxed-point and best-response assumptions of
Nash equilibrium, nesting both cognitive hierarchy and logit QRE as special cases. Viewed through the lens of this model, our
data imply that for larger groups, the rationality parameters in our model are farther from perfect rationality, or, equivalently,
that the expected ﬁnancial earnings in the game are less capable of organizing behavior. Therefore, the excess expenditure
in larger groups arises for two reasons: because there is heterogeneity in decisions in the ﬁrst place, and because decisions
are less clearly tied to ﬁnancial incentives in the larger group settings.
Our result on average individual expenditure contrasts with the preceding literature, as well as the prediction of Nash
equilibrium. The most directly comparable prior study is that of Anderson and Stafford (2003). Their design was within-
subjects and one-shot. Each participant was given a set of six scenarios and asked to formulate expenditures for each of them.
After all decisions were made, one of the scenarios was chosen at random, and the decisions of the participants were played
out. One possible reason for the contrast in results is that their instrument more directly suggests that the expenditure
decision should depend on the number of other participants, as participants needed to contemplate scenarios with various
numbers of opponents. In our across-subjects design, participants did know the number of opponents they faced, but were
not asked to contemplate other group sizes. Similarly, participants in the experiment of Morgan et al. (2012) had experience
in contests with different numbers of participants over the course of a session.
Nevertheless, while the cue on the number of players in the contest was less direct in our setting, this information “should”
have fed through over time, with players better-responding to aggressive play by reducing expenditure. A novelty in our
results is our linkage between lower rationality parameters in our logit cognitive hierarchy model and period-by-period
adjustments. Subjects become less likely to change their expenditure levels in larger groups, and furthermore, conditional
on making an adjustment, that adjustment is less likely to be in the direction of the better response. This suggests that our
subjects found the nine-player group to be a signiﬁcantly more challenging learning environment.
The implications of the theoretical and experimental results on noisy behavior in contests depend on the domain of
application of the model, and the objectives of the contest designer. In the case of political rent-seeking or research and
development races, if expenditures represent efforts which are fully dissipated in the contest and have no spillover, scrap,
or other socially redeeming value, then our results are negative; it would be socially optimal to avoid the existence of the
contest altogether, since the net surplus would be negative. However, if the contest is being used, for example, in a ﬁrm
as one method to encourage worker effort, then these models predict contests might be signiﬁcantly more effective in
accomplishing this objective than Nash equilibrium would indicate.
Following many previous studies, we presented the contest model in our instructions using a lottery or rafﬂe frame. The
use of lotteries as fundraising vehicles is attested as far back as the construction of the Great Wall of China. Large-scale
state-run lotteries exist, and are quite proﬁtable, in many countries. Lotteries on this scale offer small chances of winning
enormous, life-changing prizes, and therefore a “chance to buy hope.” (Clotfelter and Cook, 1989, 1990; Cook and Clotfelter,
1993) Lotteries also occur widely on much more modest scales as fundraisers for schools, churches, community groups,
and the like. Laboratory experiments in the lottery frame abstract away from massive prizes, small probabilities, and the
possibility of charitable motives. In this frame, models of noisy boundedly rational behavior predict lotteries can be proﬁtable
even in small groups, due solely to modest amounts of noise in decision-making.14
Appendix A. Supplementary dataSupplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.
2013.12.010.
14 Because of our use of the lottery frame in the experimental procedures, it is perhaps in the case of such fundraising rafﬂes that our experimental results
have  the most direct external validity.
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